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Abstract 
The paper analyses the varieties of smart urbanism to be found in the contemporary urban landscape 
in the UK. In so doing, it builds on and extends two currently dominant sets of critiques of the smart 
city: those that call into question its technocratic and top-down modes of governance, and those that 
describe the smart city as an empty signifier. The paper makes sense of the UK’s variegated local 
smart urban practices, by tracing the emergence of a national, state-led cultural economy of smart 
urbanism. Based on an analysis of smart city programmes in 34 UK cities, we identify two broad 
discursive logics through a national variation of smart urbanism is produced and performed.  First, the 
invocation of crisis forms a discursive foundation on which place-specific logics are based. Second, a 
set of what we term variegated logics are differently combined to build on the ‘foundational story’ of 
crisis, in the construction of local smart agendas. We discuss three of these variegated logics: the city 
portrayed as technological simulacrum; the focus on specific sectoral activities; and a chameleonic 
tendency to envelop previous eco-urban agendas into smart urbanism. The critical questions raise by 
these UK-specific logics demonstrate the value of considering particular multi-scalar constellations of 
smart urbanism through a cultural economy lens. 
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Introduction 
It is increasingly popular to think about the urban future through the lens of smart city 
policies and imaginaries. However, the smart city has also been criticised as a temporary 
rhetorical device (de Jong et al. 2015), or an empty signifier (Davidson 2010). The question 
arises of how to theorise and analyse the processes through which a nebulous concept such as 
smart urbanism can lead to tangible urban materialities. We understand smart urban 
discourses as constitutive of emergent urban materialities: as Kong and Woods (2018, 698) 
highlight, smart urbanism is, ‘in its abstract form, […] a discursive construct that will morph 
over time and space; in its applied form, it is an urban response to the digital era.’ We 
acknowledge both of these (discursive and practical) aspects by tracing the emergence of a 
cultural economy of smart urbanism in the UK, identifying some ways in which it is 
discursively performed at local level in response to state-led steering. Making the discursive 
logics of this cultural economy visible opens up space for debate over the nature and 
purposes of smart urbanism-inflected visions of the urban future. Specifically, it highlights 
the key role of three intertwined factors: the use of notions of crisis as springboards for 
policy, the enduring role of the state in stimulating local (smart) urban development, and the 
importance of city-specific context when considering the translation of smart urbanism into 
local realities. 
 
Smart urbanism is understood, here, as an increasingly dynamic relationship between cities, 
the market, governance arrangements (at various scales) and data (Leszczynski 2016). It has 
been the focus of significant institutional and corporate activity in the UK. In 2013, the UK’s 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (DBIS) identified the smart cities market as a 
national strategic economic development opportunity (DBIS 2013), and commissioned the 
British Standards Institute (BSI) to produce a smart cities standard (Joss et al. 2017). 
Organisations with more specific remits have emerged, such as the smart ticketing-focused 
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Smart Cities Partnership, founded in 2013 (Smart Cities Partnership 2016).  Professional 
Service Provider (PSP) corporations in the sector include global law firm Osborne Clarke, 
describing itself as ‘the smart cities law firm’ (Osborne Clark 2016). New industry bodies 
include SmarterUK, representing smart technology firms as part of the techUK grouping of 
900 companies (techUK 2016). Meanwhile, as of 2018, three UK universities run smart city-
specific Masters programmes, and another seven institutions offer programmes in related 
areas (such as urban analytics and the Internet of Things, or IoT). Far from constituting a 
disembodied vision, the ‘UK smart city’ describes a fluid assemblage of discourse, dispersed 
institutional agency, and material practices (Taylor Buck and While 2017). Thus, a concept 
often used vaguely by policy, corporate and academic actors (Albino et al. 2015; de Jong et 
al. 2015; Hollands 2008; Wiig 2016) has the potential to induce urban change lasting far 
longer than the ‘smart’ label itself. Urban change is thus co-constituted by discursive and 
material practices that leverage the smart city ideal. 
 
The following argues that smart urbanism in the UK is usefully understood through a cultural 
economy lens. This conceptualises economic phenomena as self-realising, emergent, and 
rooted in practices that perform the economy (Berndt and Boeckler 2009, Shelton 2017). This 
approach helps make sense of the UK’s variegated landscape of smart urban practices, by 
identifying commonalities in the logics underpinning their discursive justification. In using 
the notion of variegation, we build on work that understands the variegation of urban 
sustainability practices as geographical differentiation across different scales and 
‘conjunctural experimentations shaped by local contestations, contradictory evolutions, and 
multi-scalar regulatory forces’ (Chang and Sheppard 2013, 73). While the focus is on 
initiatives at the city scale, it is important to remain aware that urban experimentation often 
consists in incremental change based on piecemeal projects rather than locally-translated 
national strategies (Taylor Buck and While 2017). Nonetheless, the analysis below highlights 
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how a local collage of smart urban projects and activities can emerge and be discursively 
framed into a city-wide vision that speaks to nationally-set funding streams and policy 
imperatives.  
 
The analytical approach is explained below, followed by discussion of the cultural economy 
of smart cities. The discursive logics within which the emergence of UK smart urbanism can 
be situated are then analysed. The concept of discursive logics builds on work by Luque et al. 
(2014) defining logics as narrative devices that help constitute specific understandings of 
urban development trends. Such logics are textual, spoken and image-based ‘efforts to… 
image the future city’ (Luque et al. 2014, 82). They function as key organising themes in a 
cultural economy of smart urbanism through their work as strategic legitimisations (Sum and 
Jessop 2013) for urban initiatives. In so doing, they are central to the performance, 
calculation, framing and materialisation of smart urbanism in the geographically-specific 
contexts considered below. In a UK urban context, they help to elucidate how the complex 
landscape of local smart city initiatives emerged in response to the emergence of state-led 
funding streams aimed at smart urbanism. 
 
The first identified logic constructs the smart city as a response to notions of impending 
urban crisis. This tendency is more or less explicitly evident across the cases considered, and 
forms the broad landscape within which more localised and nuanced logics operate. Three of 
these are identified, constituting local enabling narratives: a.) the technological simulacrum 
as urban anchor point for related initiatives; b.) a sectoral focus justifying local smart 
strategies with recourse to notions of geographically-specific entrepreneurial 
competitiveness; and c.) chameleonic discourses,  enveloping previous, eco-urban agendas 
(i.e. around low-carbon initiatives, resilient urbanism, and eco-urbanism) into ‘smart’ 
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agendas, as a way of making sense of local priorities and initiatives to a national and 
international policy and corporate audience. 
 
Methodology 
The paper is based on in-depth, qualitative investigation of smart city discourses produced by 
UK cities (city councils, boroughs, urban authorities such as the Greater London Authority, 
and other urban municipal institutions). Based on preliminary content analysis of the policy 
documents produced in the 76 UK cities with a population above 100,000, 34 were identified 
as having substantial smart city programmes either planned or underway. Documents (policy 
reports, city council strategies and visions, websites, and minutes of city council meetings) 
produced between 2012 and 2016 by these 34 city councils, as well as urban agencies and the 
national government, and focused on the smart city or cognate initiatives (for example, 
around the digital city), were collected and analysed. 
 
Thematic coverage of smart city-focused documentation was mapped for the 34 cities, across 
six discursive regimes: urban governance, economy, environment, mobilities, social 
sustainability, and grassroots initiatives. Discursive categories covering a range of different 
themes within these regimes were analysed and segmented. Categories were selected based, 
initially, on existing smart city mapping research (European Parliament 2014), supplemented 
with smart city categorisations proposed by Yin et al. (2015). These were expanded into a 
total of 191 sub-categories, through which the documents were analysed.  
 
The resulting comparative data enabled the selection of ten cities for closer analysis, based on 
three criteria: a.) each should display relatively well-developed smart city policies and/or 
programmes of activities; b.) each city should demonstrate relative breadth of sectoral 
coverage (for example, cities whose smart policies largely targeted a single field of activity, 
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such as parking, were excluded); c.) the cases as a whole should exhibit geographical spread. 
The ten selected cases (Birmingham, Bristol, Glasgow, London, Manchester, Milton Keynes, 
Newcastle, Nottingham, Peterborough, and Sheffield) are not intended to constitute a 
representative cross-section of all UK cities at different stages of mobilising and 
implementing smart city ideas. The aim was to capture the variety of more fully developed 
local discourses that are part and parcel of corporate, governance, and technological 
processes which co-produce the ‘actually existing smart city’ (Shelton et al. 2015).  
 
A cultural economy of smart urbanism 
The paper begins by acknowledging the key role of constructed logics of smart urbanism 
(Kitchin 2015; Kitchin et al. 2016; Krivý 2016; Luque-Ayala and Marvin 2015; Vanolo 
2013). The range of logics analysed in this paper is diverse in terms of the actors and 
networks that produce them (Calzada 2017; McNeill 2015, 2016; Söderström et al. 2014), 
and also with regards to their strategic aim. White (2016), for example, shows how smart city 
visions often depend on ‘anticipatory logics’, constructed notions of crisis and technocratic 
necessity that often become self-fulfilling fictions (Picon 2015). The multiplicity of these 
meanings and discourses is not surprising. This is because ‘smart’ could be described as an 
‘empty signifier’, a conceptual envelope up for grabs and open to debate (Swyngedouw 
2010). It is also unsurprising that smart city discourses (both policy and corporate) are 
unclear and variegated (Wiig 2016). The lack of conceptual clarity makes smart urbanism 
appealing: the ‘smart’ concept can be mobilised for whatever ends are required in a specific 
(urban, governance, market, national or global) context. 
 
Definitional debates around smart urbanism can be placed within the framework of what can 
be termed a cultural economy of smart urbanism. A key insight from cultural economy is that 
there is no clear distinction between market-based and non-market phenomena (Barry and 
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Slater 2002; Berndt and Boeckler 2009; Lépinay 2011), leading to studies of how ‘the 
practical self-realization of economic knowledge’ (Berndt and Boeckler 2009, 536) arises, in 
areas as diverse as housing markets (Smith et al. 2006) and new economic sectors (Caprotti 
2012). We add to this by arguing that smart urbanism, as an organising concept for thinking 
about future urban trajectories (not restricted to the urban economy), can be understood 
through the ways in which smart cities are performed, calculated and thus framed and 
materialised through specific discursive logics.  
 
Performance is the cultural process through which multiple actors construct and enact, both 
through discursive and practice-based actions, specific visions and iterations of the smart city 
(Butler 2010; Muniesa 2014). These iterations are performed relationally and collectively, at 
the same time that they become territorialised. In the case of urban authorities devising smart 
city strategies, performance becomes a way through which cities, not driven by a purely 
economic logic, ‘are responsive to wider logics and imperatives that frame and are 
intertwined in economic action, and are influenced by the varying values, beliefs and 
agendas’ (Dowling et al. 2016, 40) of urban actors. 
 
Calculation, meanwhile, involves processes through which smart urbanism is measured, 
defined and (sometimes) quantified. It is constitutive of the performance of markets through 
the action of calculative actors with ‘a clear notion of how they expect [smart urbanism] 
generally, and [the smart city in the UK] in particular, to behave’ (Smith et al. 2006, 86, 
authors’ text in brackets). As it applies to the smart city, calculation can take place through 
smart city metrics, indicator systems, evaluation frameworks, and Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) (Joss 2015). One example is the negotiation of the British Smart Cities 
Standard, which produces standardised, serial meanings around what it is to be a smart city in 
the UK (Joss et al. 2017). As Zook (2017, 11) argues when critically analysing the use of Big 
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Data in smart urban governance, ‘metrics don’t simply measure…these data are 
simultaneously defining what cities are.’ Thus, while the UK smart city may be partially 
rooted in highly technical flows of data, code and technological know-how, these are all 
made sense of and integrated into a matrix of meanings through discursive practices around 
the multiple meanings of the urban. The performed and calculated smart city is also framed 
within variously fluid or specific discursive limits through processes of framing. Framing, in 
turn, is predicated on the existence of specific discursive logics which establish the limits of 
the frame, and which also function to justify specific framings.  
 
A key example of the performance of a cultural economy of smart urbanism in the UK is the 
2012-13 Future Cities Demonstrator (FCD) competition for smart city projects. In this 
competition, £25.5m was allocated for 30 cities to submit project proposals outlining specific 
smart city visions. This opened up a marketplace for the framing and ‘selling’, by local 
governments, of city projects along specific lines developed by the UK government’s 
innovation agency. The FCD initiative thus provided the contextual envelope within which 
city councils, and other actors, could begin to seek government funding by aligning urban 
policies and priorities to a ‘smart’ urban agenda. This brings us to our final conceptual 
foundational point, namely the importance of considering the way(s) in which the 
performance of the smart city becomes grounded in place, and materially expressed in 
policies, strategies, projects, initiatives and built environments. We argue that 
geographically-specific iterations of smart urbanism in the UK city emerge through what 
Kennedy (2016) has called a process of argumentation. This is the process not only through 
which specific smart city policies and projects are defined, debated and operationalised, but 
also the socio-cultural and techno-economic process through which one (internal) round of 
argumentation (focused on the elaboration of specific policies) enables an (outward-facing) 
presentation of policies and projects so as to appeal to, or make sense of, these self-same 
9 
 
strategies in the key of smart urbanism. It is in this context that discursive logics really come 
to the fore: in both helping to frame and justify specific visions and strategies for the smart 
city with reference to broader imperatives (for example, crisis, broadly defined). 
 
Varieties of smart urbanism 
Our analytical focus highlights the multiple ways in which smart city discourses, based on 
particular logics, become grounded and rooted in individual urban projects and strategies. 
Indeed, and as noted above, smart city discourses are rooted in attempts to connect often 
geographically-specific projects to wider urban agendas through the use of the ‘smart’ label. 
We use the term ‘geographically-specific’ to identify smart city activities based in individual 
cities: this contrasts with the wider circulation of discourses around smart urbanism that are 
promoted by national and global policy and corporate actors. It can be expected that different 
UK cities will develop and perform sometimes very different strategies nonetheless labelled 
‘smart’. Thus, smart urbanism is not only variegated across space and between cities, but also 
within specific cities (Goh 2015). Indeed, while ‘the smart city is being realised in tangible 
and ordinary locales, there is scant evidence and critical reflection on how this is taking 
place’ (Karvonen et al. 2018, 1). Thus, we focus on the ‘actually existing smart city’ (Shelton 
et al. 2015) in the UK, in vision and practice, rather than blueprints for flagship, greenfield 
and new-build smart cities. 
 
How did the various iterations of smart urbanism in the UK begin to emerge? A key moment 
in the production of discourses and visions of the smart city was the organisation of the state-
led 2012-13 FCD competition, mentioned above. This can be understood as a breakthrough 
event that placed smart city strategies at the forefront of city council agendas (Taylor Buck 
and While 2017). The competition was enabled by a £25.5m fund administered by Future 
Cities Catapult, a London-based innovation accelerator funded by Innovate UK (a UK 
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government-financed agency). The competition can be seen in the broader context of trends 
in UK urban policy: since the 1970s, this has been partly based on the project of translating 
and communicating national policy imperatives to the city level. More recently, national 
urban policy has exhibited an area-based focus, and a ‘localism’ agenda attempting to 
encourage city councils to prioritise economic growth (Harding et al. 2015). Thus, the FCD 
initiative was significant in that it became the conduit through which state funding was made 
available to UK cities, and at the same time it shaped a discursive context within which local 
city authorities had to operate in their discursive performance of future-focused smart city 
projects. 
 
The Future Cities competition was significant not only in its state-led nature, but also in the 
low participation of private sector actors in kick-starting the competition. While this 
underlines the key role of the state in directing urban development trends, it also highlights 
the functional constraints under which state steering operates. In the case of the Future Cities 
competition, ‘it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that municipal governments were being 
asked to prospect for private-sector investment on behalf of central government but with 
limited generative power’ (Taylor Buck and While 2017, 515). The competition made 
available an initial round of £50,000 grants to fund feasibility studies and proposals to host a 
smart city demonstrator project, for which the single winner would receive £24m. In 2013, 30 
studies were funded out of 50 applications. Based on this, 26 cities submitted a bid for the 
£24m demonstrator grant, finally awarded to Glasgow (InnovateUK 2016). In developing 
feasibility studies, city councils commissioned consultancies and other groups to conduct 
research, design reports, and craft proposals that would effectively frame and perform their 
version of the smart city for a national funding audience.  
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A key result of the FCD initiative was its function in sparking the production of multiple 
smart city visions by UK city councils. Few UK cities had anything that could be described 
as a smart city vision or plan prior to 2012 (with the exception of London’s smart 2012 
Olympics focus). The competition catalysed the development of a spatially variegated 
landscape of smart urbanism by the end of 2013. This was part of the formation of a cultural 
economy of smart city discourses representing different actor networks, priorities, and 
understandings of the role of ‘smartness’ in the city. While actors (consultants, designers, and 
others) engaged in national and global smart urban discourses are often active in circulating 
similar smart city visions and blueprints across different urban contexts, the involvement of 
city councils in the UK competition meant that these circulating discourses were translated 
for each local context, and thus framed in local priorities and historical trajectories. The result 
is that 2012-13 saw the creation of 50 distinct visions for the UK smart city. Whether or not 
these became operational, what is significant is that state action (through the competition) 
sparked the emergence of smart urban visions (led by local government), ranging from the 
very high-tech to more nuanced strategies. The following explores the broad discursive 
mechanisms through which geographically specific ongoing strategies have since then been 
framed and justified. 
 
Discourses of urban crisis 
The first, broad discursive logic identified is that of the smart city as a response to 
constructed notions of urban crisis. The use of crisis discourses to justify technological, 
political, and other interventions at the heart of the city has been widely explored (Jones and 
Ward 2002). For example, climate change (Caprotti 2015; Doulton and Brown 2009) or 
austerity (Pollio 2016) crisis discourses have been used to justify specific smart urban visions 
and strategies. More broadly, White (2016) identifies three main crisis discourses used as 
justifications for smart urbanism, focused on demographic and resource pressures, climate 
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change, and fiscal austerity, narrowing the discursive arena around potential urban 
development pathways (White 2016). The construction of crisis, therefore, functions as a 
mechanism through which deeply modern notions of using technology to liberate the city 
(Harvey 1996) can be deployed and justified. Crisis, then, forms a discursive backdrop, 
justifying the production of local smart city storylines that can be used to perform urban 
projects to state-level initiatives such as the FCD competition. 
 
British urban policy has been stimulated and influenced by cycles of crisis (Jones and Ward 
2002). With regards to smart cities, various crisis discourses function as logics to make sense 
of a municipal ‘turn’ towards smart city projects. Future Cities Catapult and Arup (a built 
environment-focused PSP) argued, in a 2014 report on the ‘future cities market’, that: 
 
‘[P]ublic authorities are demanding better and more cost-effective ways to deliver 
services that exploit the promise of new technologies in a context of strained budgets 
and intensified future risks.’ (Walt et al. 2014, 6) 
 
Based on this, it appears that the British smart city’s foundational story more often than not 
rests on a stated need to ‘respond’ to crisis (although how crisis is articulated differs 
depending on the specific city). The UK government’s innovation agency, in a blog post 
reflecting on the 2012 FCD competition, framed its discussion of smart cities by stating that 
‘city life and its management is becoming ever more complex’ (Saraf 2015, np). The UK’s 
urban condition is then swiftly diagnosed as being in a state of crisis: 
 
‘Some of our cities are at crisis point and it is therefore imperative that this is 
addressed. Doing so will help the competitiveness and sustainability of the UK’s 
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cities, and also support the UK businesses offering such solutions […] before taking 
them to the rest of the world.’ (Saraf 2015, np) 
 
This underlines the link between notions of crisis and a constructed need to improve 
‘competitiveness and sustainability’ and ‘support UK businesses’. It is not surprising, then, 
that local smart city strategies discursively perform attempts to ‘solve’ crisis, while often 
omitting any mention of crisis areas outside the economic sphere. 
 
At the city scale, the 2012 Future Birmingham strategy is an example of the justification of 
urban initiatives, in part at least, through reference to the ‘major threat to Birmingham’s 
economic well-being and social cohesion’ posed by perils including ‘the banking and 
Eurozone crisis, and the Government’s resulting deficit management policies’, with the city 
at the mercy of ‘global economic forces’ (Birmingham City Council 2012a, 8). The focus on 
economic crisis in framing the need for a smart urban response was consistently echoed 
throughout policy documentation: for example, in the city’s smart roadmap, the ‘national and 
international financial situation’ are blamed for deepening ‘many of the inequalities in the 
city’, while the national austerity landscape ‘significantly affect[s] the ability and freedom’ of 
Birmingham to develop anything more than basic public service offerings (Birmingham City 
Council 2012b, 8). The crisis envelope is underlined in a blog post by Annette King, 
innovation manager for Digital Birmingham. The post argues that the economic crisis context 
requires a response from the city council which develops Birmingham into a smart city, 
because otherwise ‘our citizens, businesses…will not become competitive….we will be left 
behind and economic growth will stagnate’ (King 2014, np). 
 
In another example, Glasgow City Council’s (GCC) urban resilience strategy leverages 
notions of continued, pressing crises to call for solutions to be implemented at the urban scale 
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(GCC 2016). The strategy thus focused on deploying smart urbanism to securitise the city in 
the face of challenges to its current and near-term resilience (Evans and Reid 2014). It 
highlights both chronic stressors (that may last decades, like industrial change), and acute 
shocks (such as sudden climatic events) as potential crisis points. These discursive logics of 
crisis are, in turn, placed within a historically contingent setting: 
 
‘in the last two centuries Glasgow has seen more change than in all its long previous 
history. It was one of the first cities in the world to experience the profound shocks of 
modernity as the Industrial Revolution led to its rapid expansion and a swelling 
population […] Glasgow experienced the twin shocks of very rapid de-industrialisation 
and population loss […]. 
 
As a result, Glasgow’s people have experienced chronic levels of stress which have 
produced profound disparities in income, health and opportunity. The most recent profile 
of our population’s wellbeing shows the extent of the impact of the chronic stresses. 
Glasgow continues to have the poorest life expectancy in Scotland for both men and 
women, rich and poor. These are some of the issues to which our resilience strategy is 
very much directed. (GCC 2016, 10; italics added by authors). 
 
The above-quoted text historically contextualises Glasgow as characterised by myriad socio-
economic, structural and other concerns. This provides justification for the roll-out of smart 
projects marketed as solutions: the city needs to ‘identify new smart solutions that we can use 
to address specific resilience challenges’ (GCC 2016, 36). In the case of the crisis of 
economic decline, for example, city authorities argue that Glasgow ‘will support the delivery 
of digital skills to not only consume services but to be the producers of new goods and 
services, harnessing the potential of digital technologies to drive growth, stimulate innovation 
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and improve productivity’ (GCC 2016, 34). Glasgow is not the only UK city which links an 
industrial past followed by a history of decline to a need to respond through smart city 
initiatives. In Sheffield, for example, a 2015 report commissioned by Sheffield First 
Partnership, under the auspices of the city’s Executive Board and the SmartSheffield 
Advisory Group, highlighted the ‘important connections…between Sheffield’s industrial 
past, characterised by socially-progressive, family- or employee-run firms…distributing their 
goods globally… [W]e once again have similar conditions and opportunities, particularly in 
the creative and digital sectors… [T]here is an important story to be told about Sheffield’s 
track record of smart initiatives’ (SmartSheffield 2015, 22). Thus, smart city-related activities 
are seen as: a.) a response to geo-historically contingent crises; b.) a potential springboard 
liberating the city from these historical antecedents; c.) a way of addressing the crisis of 
urban economic competitiveness. They also function to make sense of smart city projects for 
a national funding audience, of which the FCD competition was a key example. Building on 
this, the following discerns three common discursive logics which form key parts of the 
cultural economy of smart urbanism in the UK city. 
 
The technological simulacrum 
The first discursive logic found in UK cities is what could be called, following Baudrillard, 
the technological simulacrum. Baudrillard identified three distinct typologies of simulacra: 
naturalistic, productionist and simulation. The technological simulacrum referred to here is 
based on the third of these, defined as ‘based on information, the model, cybernetic play. 
Their aim is maximum operationality, hyperreality, total control’ (Baudrillard 1991, 309). 
With regards to the UK smart city, the simulacrum is often centred around a specific 
technological place, coupled with a technological network. Baudrillard used the example of 
the hypermarket: a specific building, but also the centre of networked activity requiring 
infrastructures (freeways, parking lots, computer systems) (Baudrillard 1994). This is 
16 
 
reflected in urban commentary that has recently highlighted how technology corporations’ 
headquarters and campuses in California are built as simulacra of cities (Tolva 2014). 
 
Technological places functioning as simulacra include examples such as the Glasgow 
Operations Centre (GOC). Funded by the city’s winning bid for the FCD competition, the 
GOC institutes both a socio-technical assemblage of data, knowledge, technology, capital and 
governmental practices (Barns 2016; Kitchin et al. 2015, 2016; Mattern 2015), and a visual, 
material anchor for the smart city: a place of visibility (of data and digital flows, certainly, 
but also of material infrastructure and human and symbolic capital). This visibility is not 
necessarily architectural, as in the case of Rio de Janeiro’s Operations Centre, housed in a 
cuboid, imposing purpose-built structure. Rather, the GOC is visible online, where its 
interior, with its ‘total of around 1,000 screens’ (Crawford 2017), is displayed in images 
reminiscent of the representation of Apollo space programme control rooms (Mattern 2015). 
The GOC-as-simulacrum functions not only as a nodal point around which Glasgow’s smart 
city imaginaries are organised (Caprotti 2018), but also as a simulacrum of safety, security 
and response to crisis. The Future City Glasgow strategy underlines smart city development 
projects in several areas, among which urban safety is dominant (Future City Glasgow 2017). 
The GOC is security-focused: it integrates data feeds from CCTV, police intelligence, traffic 
management systems, and other sources. The GOC’s own website describes the centre as 
providing: ‘co-ordinated, real-time, intelligence-led response to incidents large and small 
across the city, placing Glasgow at the leading edge of smart city management’ (GOC 2017). 
It is a technological simulacrum because it constitutes a ‘themed’ place attempting to 
simulate ‘perfections of reality’ (Oong and Jin 2017, 229) in its underlying aim of governing 
the city through data. 
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The GOC is also a technological network because of its constructed role as a nodal point in 
the city’s digital data flows. In this sense, the GOC as simulacrum potentially adopts the role 
of the technological fetish: it masks the socio-economic and other relations that produce data 
flows (about crime, disorder, traffic, and other ‘anomalies’ that must be ‘managed’) in the 
city. Technological places like the GOC have a masking effect because what can be seen and 
managed are data, not the deeper structures and inequalities through which measurable data 
are produced. Perhaps this is clearest in cities in the Global South with smart ambitions: 
Watson’s work on African smart city projects highlights a ‘fundamental gap between the 
vision of these future cities...and the reality of poverty in the actually existing city’ (Watson 
2015, 37). The cultural economic role of the envisioning of these ‘fantasy’ (ibid) places not 
only focuses on constructing places and meanings, but also on masking urban conditions. 
 
The technological simulacrum also appears in plans and projects to turn Bristol into a smart 
city. The technological place is embodied in the Bristol Data Dome, a repurposing of the 
city’s spherical, metallic planetarium. The Dome is used to visualise data flows, and aims to 
let citizens see the city ‘with new and more informed eyes’ (Bristol is Open 2015). The 
simulacrum as technological network appears in Bristol’s smart city plans and strategies, 
focused on an array of projects including open data, fibre networks underground and on the 
bottom of the city’s canal system, an [IoT] mesh network using the city’s lampposts, and 
other initiatives aimed at ‘creating an open programmable city’ (Bristol is Open 2016). The 
simulacrum serves the purpose of making the (digital) city appear ‘better than real’ (Oong 
and Jin 2017, 229): networks of data build an urban landscape of ‘virtual cities within virtual 
cities’ (Batty and Hudson-Smith 2005, 44). Finally, it can be argued that technological places 
have a function in the territorialisation of smart urbanism in the spatial context of specific 
cities: this is part and parcel of the contextual framing and performance of a specific city as 
smart. An example of this is Newcastle’s choice of Mosley Street as the site for a smart street 
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demonstrator during the 2018 Great Exhibition of the North, a wide-ranging, three-month 
celebration of the North of England’s artistic and innovation activities. The choice of Mosley 
Street was not random: it is a significant technological place in that it establishes both a 
material and a historical link between Newcastle and technological urban futures. In 1879, 
Mosley Street was the first urban street to be lit by electric incandescent bulbs.1 In 2018, the 
smart street features embedded sensors deployed by Cisco and other corporations including 
Connexin, a Hull-based wireless service provider. Furqan Alamgir, Connexi’s founder, 
clearly linked the dawn of urban electrification with the new smart street demonstrator by 
stating that ‘just like all those years ago when electricity began to run through our streets, 
connecting our cities – making them smart – will open up possibilities that haven’t even been 
imagined yet’ (Alamgir, in Cisco 2018, np). The use of a technological place such as Mosley 
Street helps to ground and perform smart city ambitions in a city-specific context. This 
highlights a specific urban place and event as a significant moment in the performance of a 
cultural economy of the smart city at the local scale. The technological simulacrum in the UK 
smart city, then, functions not only as a place and network of connected control and 
hyperreality, but as a highly visible (in symbolic and material terms) interface between local 
urban geographies and national-level contexts and strategic priorities. 
 
Sectoral smart urbanism 
A second logic through which the cultural economy of the UK smart city is performed 
involves what can be termed sectoral smart urbanism. Rather than underpinning the 
production of a broad vision or strategy, it locates the city’s ‘smartness’ within a 
contemporary or future strength. These strengths are usually (but not always) economic: their 
identification underpins the promotion of sector-specific activities aimed at urban 
transformation. This logic draws on the crisis discourse discussed above: crises or urban 
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problems are typically presented as the foundational moments that justify a smart vision, but 
the latter is given particular form based on a narrated set of sectoral strengths.  
 
Leeds (part of our wider sample) provides a good example of this logic. Leeds City Council’s 
(LCC) smart city strategy is clearly founded on the need to respond to anticipated urban 
tensions resulting from increasing urbanisation:  
 
‘In the future a high proportion of the population of the UK will be living in urban 
areas and a significant proportion of these people will be over the age of 65 […]. 
[C]ity resources will come under increasing pressure; … putting severe strain on the 
ability of the city to keep on delivering; and the demand for health services are 
predicted to overtake supply within 10 years. This is a worldwide problem with no 
clear solutions’ (LCC 2014, 3).  
 
In parallel, city authorities clearly focus on performing Leeds’ existing economic strengths in 
health informatics, technology-enabled care, regenerative medicine, medical devices, 
diagnostics, and pharmaceuticals. Thus, the city council performs a vision of Leeds as a smart 
city for ‘delivering better health and wellbeing outcomes, enabled through information and 
technology’, and as ‘the best place to grow old’ (LCC 2014, 6). The notion of the ‘need’ for 
Leeds to develop as smart health city is also underlined by a 2015 report (LCC 2015) setting 
urban development in the context of a need for economic growth and of the challenges posed 
by an ageing population. which aims to ‘shift more health and social care out of hospitals and 
promote self-help, peer support models in settings closer to home’ (LCC 2015, np). 
 
Manchester also provides a fruitful example of smart city discourses that, partially at least, 
identify smartness with a specific sector. Manchester has a wide-ranging smart city strategy, 
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much of which is performed and materialised in the Corridor Manchester partnership. This 
initiative is a geographically-bounded area along a 2 kilometre stretch of the city’s Oxford 
Road corridor, and is led by a range of public and private actors including the city council.2  
The Corridor features several different smart city projects, from the CityVerve IoT 
demonstrator, to the Triangulum smart city lighthouse project. While the overall context 
around the use of the Oxford Road corridor for experimenting with smart urban technologies 
and practices is complex, there is also evidence of a clear focus on specific sectors. A case in 
point is the focus on health and life sciences, which form a key economic focus for the 
Corridor Manchester Enterprise Zone. The zone is now coupled with the identity of Corridor 
Manchester as a smart city hub, but it existed before the Corridor was set up (it was called the 
Greater Manchester Life Sciences Enterprise Zone) (Corridor Manchester 2018b). A clear 
discursive effort is made to frame health and life sciences businesses and innovation existing 
within the zone in the broader remit of the Corridor’s smart identity. As stated in the 
Corridor’s 2015-20 strategic vision, ‘Corridor Manchester’s latent economic potential is 
considerable. It has a leading role to play in … science-based companies; particularly bio-
health’ (Corridor Manchester nd, 20). Equally, this emphasis is based on previous economic 
activity in the area, including the pre-smart city Manchester Science Partnerships’ Central 
Campus, located next to the Oxford Road corridor and home to 120 technology and life 
sciences businesses (Corridor Manchester 2016). 
 
Like any discursive logic, that of sectoral smart urbanism has persuasive potential. At the 
same time, the deployment of discourses focused on specific economic sectors also 
exemplifies the use of ‘smart’ as an empty signifier, used to justify particular urban 
trajectories. For example, Leeds’s smart city vision might be reinterpreted as a thinly-veiled 
springboard for a neoliberalised urban system where the state becomes less involved in care 
while pushing agendas around atomised visions of ‘resilience’ (Cretney 2014, Kaika 2017). 
21 
 
Overall, a cultural economy lens helps to identify the sectoral focus of smart urbanism as a 
key mechanism through which the territorialisation of the UK smart city happens: sectoral 
discourses help to perform the smart city as a market, and in so doing enable individual cities 
to modulate their understanding of what it means to be economically smart in their specific 
geographical context.   
 
Chameleonic discourses 
A third discursive logic is the tendency to fold or rebrand eco-urban strategies into broader 
urban agendas that are then called ‘smart’. This is part of broad discursive trends through 
which a succession of different concepts gain prominence, in becoming signifiers for 
sustainable urban development (de Jong et al. 2015; Fu and Zhang 2017). A symbolic 
juxtaposition between smart and green discourses is evident in Bristol, where the Data Dome 
is faced across Millennium Square by the Energy Tree, a public art installation which, while 
providing solar-powered, free smartphone charging and wifi, is also an example of bio-
mimicry using solar panels manufactured by the Bristol Drugs Project. Thus, the cultural 
economy of smart urbanism that emerges through chameleonic discourses turns ‘smart’ urban 
projects into fantasies, in the sense that smart urbanism offers ‘a harmonious urban vision’ 
but keeps ‘the political dimension of urban vision at bay’ (Gressgård 2015, 112). 
 
An example is Peterborough, which won the £3m second prize in the 2012-13 Future Cities 
Catapult competition, and was awarded the title of 2015 Smart City of the Year at the World 
Smart Cities Congress held in Barcelona. Peterborough’s initial smart strategy included 
several projects funded through Peterborough DNA, the organisation set up to develop the 
city’s Future Cities strategic vision. Most of these were clearly sectoral, focused on areas 
such as smart health and the creative economy (the iDream Academy). Other projects 
focused on activities such as low-energy lighting (HeatLight project), repurposing coffee 
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sacks used by cafes (Peterborough Reuse), and solar heating and cooling (the Solar Polar 
project) (Future Peterborough 2017a). These activities are easily classifiable as ‘eco-urban’ 
and, previously, would probably have been described as ‘low carbon’ projects. By 2016, 
Peterborough DNA had been replaced by Future Peterborough, a strategic programme with a 
clear focus on low-carbon activities and circular economy transformations through the 
Circular Peterborough programme. This is aimed at ‘making the most of the resources we 
have locally, supporting economic resiliences, developing strong communities and increasing 
environmental sustainability’ (Future Peterborough 2017b). It is interesting that this focus 
loses all reference to concepts and terms (such as data, digital, IoT, and other commonly used 
words) that lie at the heart of most discussions of the smart city: it indicates an enveloping of 
city priorities within the ‘smart’ label so as to render city initiatives legible and attractive at 
wider scales.  
 
The examples of Peterborough, Manchester and Bristol highlight the use of ‘smart’ by city 
authorities as a way of making sense of the shape-shifting nature of urban sustainability 
discourses. This enables municipal actors to:  
 
a.) Connect with, and speak to, national, corporate and global smart city discourses and 
strategies. This, in part, reflects current inertias and lock-ins regarding urban 
development trajectories. Smart city strategies in the UK are characteristically 
pursued through growth-focused private-public partnerships involving large 
technology corporations, ‘relationships […] often pre-established with ‘big players’, 
such as Capita, Serco, Cisco, IBM, Microsoft, or Philips’ (Viitanen and Kingston 
2014, 814): their economic growth focus resembles that of other cities in similar 
economic contexts in terms of smart urban development priorities (Alizadeh 2017); 
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b.) Simultaneously pursue strategic urban development directions that are context- and 
place-specific. This may occur, at the city level, through the engagement of non-
hegemonic corporate actors. For example, using case studies of the roll-out of smart 
metering technology in Sheffield and Leeds, Viitanen et al. (2015) highlight how, 
rather than focusing on large technology corporations, it is useful to also analyse the 
universe of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) that can respond to ‘local 
market signals and opportunities’ (Viitanen et al. 2015, 37). Rather than theorising the 
private sector as a series of top-down multinationals, the approach proposed by 
Viitanen et al. (2015) underlines the role of community and citizen feedback 
(mediated via apps and similar technologies) that enable SMEs to respond to local 
priorities. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
The emergence of the complex landscape of smart urbanism in the UK leads to several 
reflections, premised by acknowledging that our focus does not consider alternative 
discourses ‘at the edges’ of smart city policy and practice, or those produced by actors lying 
outside the policy-corporate dyad that produces many smart city strategies and visions. 
Nevertheless, our use of a cultural economy conceptual lens highlights how smart city 
discourse does not simply exist at the level of imaginations or visions, but is closely 
intertwined with the production of local urban materialities. On this note, four concluding 
reflections are offered on: the agency of discursive logics based on crisis; the importance of 
the state in urban development trajectories; the production of geographically-specific smart 
urbanism; and the need to engage at depth with the role of the private sector. 
 
First, we underline the key role of the state in triggering the emergence of smart city visions 
and pathways (while acknowledging firms’ agency in shaping urban investment markets). 
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The state was a central actor in the development of visions of the UK smart city, due to the 
role of the government-funded FCD competition. This functioned as: a discursive ‘event’ in 
the envisioning of the UK smart city; a way of performing the smart city in the key of 
entrepreneurial and competitive urbanism; and as a calculative actor in the ranking and 
competitive selection of smart city proposals. Through the competition to select and fund 
smart city projects, the state exerted power in a growing cultural economy of smart urbanism. 
 
Highlighting the state’s role leads to questions around the direction of urban futures in an era 
interested in developing (and moving past) smart urbanism. This may seem at odds with pro-
urban rhetoric foregrounding the agency of individual cities in a globalised economy. Indeed,  
 
‘The state plays a pivotal role in the process of organising urban socio-ecological 
transformation […]. [I]t helps shape who is exploited, ignored, rewarded and listened 
to. […] The role of the state needs to be placed more centrally in our understanding of 
how and what eco-technical systems emerge’ (Swyngedouw 2016, 140). 
 
This is expressed in UK government and policy spheres. The FCD competition provided a 
national-level context within which vision-based experimentation took place, followed by 
more geographically specific experimentation in individual cities. These visions may (or may 
not) differ, in part at least, from the smart city ‘solutions’ and ‘packages’ offered by large 
multinationals (Taylor Buck and While 2017). As a report to the UK Parliament’s Science 
and Technology Committee by the Future Technologies Team at the UK Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) acknowledged, ‘the complexity of delivering economic 
and environmental sustainability, and good quality of life, in cities in the future’ means that  
‘there can be a role for Government in supporting targeted demonstrator projects where these 
are unlikely to emerge without this action.’ (DCMS 2016, 4) This is a space of political 
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possibility. As long as state-mediated steering is informed by, and responds to, urban 
imperatives based on local needs (however defined) rather than purely market requirements, 
then the type of analysis offered here contributes to a mapping of potential zones of 
engagement with policy discourse at moments when they can still be influenced (Cowley et 
al. 2017; Joss and Cowley 2017).  
 
Second, the construction of smart city plans and strategies as responses to crisis, potentially 
boxes these visions into neoliberalising and technocratically authoritarian pathways (Cardullo 
and Kitchin 2017; Ho 2017). As shown above, crisis discourses provide a range of actors 
with springboards for justifying ‘solutions’ proffered through smart city investments and 
projects. In Bristol, for example, notions of crisis are linked to ideals of urban resilience in 
advocating smart technologies’ potential for enabling the city and its residents to ‘learn’ from 
crisis events: ‘By enabling the capacity and ingenuity of all of their citizens, these cities will 
use every disaster, crisis or challenge to recover in a stronger, smarter and fairer way’ (Bristol 
City Council 2016, np). As scholars (Derickson 2017) have recently argued, an increasingly 
popular policy focus on resilience (with its clarion calls for the capability to ‘bounce back’ 
from crisis), often regressively masks underlying socio-economic and other vulnerabilities 
(Kaika 2017). In the UK smart city, resilience is often deployed to promote normative 
agendas (Thoré and Olsson 2017) focused on economic competitiveness. 
 
Discourses framing the smart city as a response to crisis run the risk of individualising risk 
and catalysing neoliberal or even authoritarian eco-urban politics (Rosol et al 2017; Chang 
2017; Ho 2017; Kong and Woods 2018). While Bristol’s resilience strategy celebrates the 
city as a ‘leader in…smart city digital innovation’ (Bristol City Council 2016, np), it refers to 
smart city projects which focus exclusively on data, transport, mobility, energy, and air 
quality. While most of these could also be branded as ‘low-carbon’ projects, and while some 
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(for example, energy) clearly relate to current inequalities, they do little to address other, 
major urban societal challenges faced by Bristol (from housing to homelessness). This opens 
up an opportunity to a.) question the ‘need’ to use crisis narratives as justifications of future 
urban development pathways; b.) advocate for a purposive rather than a purely responsive 
notion of urban strategy. Crisis logics are replete with the agency of technology, corporate, 
consultancy, engineering, design and certain policy actors. Grassroots, activist, voiceless, 
marginalised, poor, dissenting, and other voices are generally not represented in these 
discourses, many of which claim to speak on behalf of the whole city. As Cardullo and 
Kitchin (2017) argue in their analysis of Dublin’s smart city initiatives, while citizens can 
play different roles and have different levels of participation, these levels are:  
 
‘consistent with neoliberal citizenship and its emphasis on personal autonomy, 
consumer choice, individuals performing certain roles and taking responsibility for 
their own life chances, the marketization and privatisation of services and 
infrastructures, and the state facilitating and stewarding neoliberal forms of 
governmentality and governance and market-led solutions to urban issues’ (Cardullo 
and Kitchin 2017, np). 
 
It is imperative for scholars, policymakers and activists to now identify progressive urban 
agendas (Greenfield 2017), by taking into account local materialities and existing lock-ins, 
allowing a broader spectrum of voices to speak about the future of the UK city. What might 
this look like? While a full discussion of this is a useful focus for further work, as a minimum 
it calls for more consistent citizen engagement, over and above oft-repeated calls for 
participatory governance and planning, at all levels of governance. It also calls for 
engagement with technology corporations, and for awareness of the power geometries 
inherent when ‘citizens’ and ‘experts’ enter into conversation. If this political work is not 
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carried out then, in extremis, the UK smart city could be described as undergoing a 
Frankenstein moment (Cugurullo 2018) whereby an accretion of projects, initiatives, visions 
and interventions actively militates against the development of sustainable cities. 
 
Third, it is clear from the varieties of UK smart urbanism that discourses focused on smart 
city visions and activities are far from uniform across cities. Rather, globalised smart city 
logics and discourses are translated into national and local contexts: specific cities engage in 
a translation of local priorities and strategies back into smart discourses that can make sense 
to a national and international audience. Translation thus contributes to the socio-spatial 
variegation of smart urbanism and to its framing and performance at the city scale. The local 
urban context is key to understanding the cultural economy of the smart city, as seen by the 
importance of technological places and networks (such as the GOC or the Bristol Data 
Dome) which both mediate local meanings, and connect to internationally recognisable 
elements, of smart urbanism. This is important because it highlights the ways in which the 
cultural economy of smart urbanism is discursively and materially performed in place as well 
as more globally. Thus, understanding the socio-spatial variegation of smart urbanism helps 
shed light on the mechanisms through which urban economies, cultures and practices (such 
as those around the smart city) become territorialised. In so doing, territorialisation links to 
materialisation, whether in specific, built smart urban projects, or in ‘failed’ strategies that 
nonetheless have helped perform the urban in material ways through knowledge networks 
and other mechanisms. This reaffirms the need to focus on specific urban contexts while 
acknowledging globalised discursive and technological circuits. It is here that alternative and 
progressive notions of smart urbanism could emerge: at the level of specific projects and 
ways of doing the smart city which involve a multiplicity of actors with a stake in shaping the 
future of local urban environments (Hult and Bradley 2017). 
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Finally, there remain questions about the interlinkages between urban policy, city 
administrations, and technology corporates. The paper has shown how the UK smart city is 
often built around visions of technological simulacra: these can only be effectively and 
realistically delivered by the private sector, in partnership with city governments. In parallel, 
the discussion of chameleonic discourses highlighted how notions of smart urbanism are 
often layered over existing low-carbon and other strategic policy directions, and existing 
long-term corporate technology partnerships. Furthermore, most of the smart cities literature 
currently focuses on technology corporations but has not engaged at depth with ‘platform’ 
corporations (Srnicek 2017) (such as Google, Uber, Airbnb and Apple) that work across 
cities rather than simply providing technology services to specific cities. Thus, smart 
urbanism in the UK runs the risk of increasing ‘the power of those already powerful elites 
who set the global technological agenda and marginalise opportunities for subversion’ 
(Viitanen and Kingston 2014, 815) while promoting digital lifestyles that ‘are not inherently 
environmentally or socially benign’ (Ibid, 806). 
 
If such questions seem pertinent to smart city development generally, our main intention here 
is not to make grand claims either about their relevance, or about the direct transferability of 
the discursive logics identified earlier, to non-UK contexts. A more fundamental aim has 
been to demonstrate the value of a cultural economy lens in making context-specific logics 
visible, with the UK used as an example. The potential value of applying this analytical 
approach to smart cultural economies elsewhere lies specifically in its potential to engender 
context-specific critical questions. The expectation is not that analogous frameworks of 
actors and institutions, causes and effects, or singular catalytic ‘moments’ such as the FCD, 
will be evident in other settings. Rather, that smart cultural economies will display distinctive 
– though sometimes overlapping – logics which are shaped by their construction and 
performance through contingent conditions. 
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In the context of UK smart urbanism at least, the questions which our analysis has raised 
(around discursive hegemony, the role of the state, local contexts and public-private 
partnerships) are at the heart of pressing urban debates. Existing digital and other divides 
(and the possibility that smart city policies will deepen these), cost barriers, and the potential 
generation of a two-track urban system based on cities that are ‘smart’, and others that are 
‘analogue’, are real concerns in the UK urban context. Further research focused not only on 
case study work, but on a thematic approach to the development of smart urbanism in 
specific sectors, is key (Kong and Woods 2018). These concerns show that the development 
of a cultural economy of smart urbanism, and the production of smart city strategies and of 
actually existing smart cities (Shelton et al. 2015), are far from value-free and ethically ‘flat’, 
but riven with tensions, possibilities and agendas that are political and intertwined with the 
key question of what it might mean to be a citizen in the urban future. 
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Notes 
1 It was not the first street lit by electric lighting, however. In 1878 the Avenue de l’Opéra in Paris, and the 
Place d’Etoile in Paris were lit with electric arc lamps (Luckiesh 1926). 
2 The full list of partners is Manchester Metropolitan University, The University of Manchester, Manchester 
City Council, Central Manchester University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, the Royal Northern College of 
Music, Manchester Science Partnerships, Bruntwood, a UK-based property corporation, and Arup, a global 
design and engineering firm (Corridor Manchester 2018a).  
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